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Financial contracting and re-rating experience, the cases of make whole, claw back and other 
wise ordinary callable bonds 
 
1. Introduction  
In recent years many bond indenture agreements include two new provisions, the make whole and 
the claw back provision that refine the circumstances upon which a bond can be redeemed prior to 
maturity. The make whole call price represents the present value of all coupon and principal 
repayments. The call price is determined by a discount rate set as the yield on a similar maturity 
Treasury bond plus a fixed spread. This implies that the firm has little incentive to refinance its debt 
due to a fall in the level of interest rates. Similarly, the claw back provision reduces the incentive to 
refinance in order to save on interest costs by allowing the firm to call debt only from the proceeds 
of an equity issue. We seek to understand the purpose of these new refinements of the ordinary call 
provision. 
Goyal et al. (1998) and Nayar and Stock (2008) find evidence that make whole and claw 
back bonds are justified by alleviating agency problems such as the underinvestment problem that is 
often present for firms with risky prospects and debt in its capital structure. Yet while this work 
shows that stockholders can benefit from the use of these provision it is not clear whether 
bondholders do. For example Nayar and Stock (2008) find that the stock of firms that issue make 
whole bonds enjoy a significant favorable price reaction to the issue, have superior post issue 
returns and analysts forecast higher post issue growth for firms issuing make whole bonds. Yet the 
literature is silent on whether bondholders benefit.   
The situation is made more puzzling because Banko and Zhou (2010) find that the classic 
call option is used to resolve a combination of asymmetric information and underinvestment 
problems. Therefore the justification for refinements of the classic call option is not clear as firstly, 
the classic call option seems able to handle the underinvestment problem anyway and secondly, the 
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existing empirical evidence does not examine whether make whole and claw back bondholders 
actually benefit from the resolution of agency problems. 
This work is of interest because we now understand that if a bond contract term appears to 
benefit shareholders ex post, it can well be the case that bondholders can anticipate these benefits 
and expropriate them in the initial terms of the bond contract. For example, as it is well understood 
from Kraus (1973) that potential interest cost savings is not a valid reason for callable bonds since 
any potential expropriation of wealth by re-issuing lower coupon bonds is anticipated by 
bondholders through higher initial coupon rates and call prices. One question that we address is 
whether make whole and claw back provisions genuinely improve callable bond contracts by better 
handling the underinvestment problem or can they be seen as an attempt to exploit bondholders in a 
zero sum game? Our insight is that if the make whole and claw back bonds represent a genuine 
improvement in dealing with the underinvestment problem then the subsequent re-rating of make 
whole and claw back bonds should be dominated by more upgrades and/or less downgrades than 
ordinary callable bonds. If the zero sum game explanation holds true, then subsequent re-rating 
experience should be no different, or indeed worse, that ordinary callable bonds so there is no 
evident reason to refine the classic call option contract. 
The underinvestment problem occurs because positive NPV projects look too risky for debt 
holders. While the firm knows their projects are “good” they have difficulty in convincing skeptical 
bondholders. As a result the firm must pay higher interest costs than they “should” given the quality 
of their projects. If the projects prove themselves bondholder’s benefit at the expense of 
stockholders as they will continue to enjoy high coupon rates even though risk is now revealed to be 
modest. This reduces the benefits that flows to the shareholders and weakens the inventive to invest. 
Meanwhile the asymmetric information problem occurs because the firm is unable to reveal the 
value of future growth opportunities without moral hazard so bondholders undervalue the firm.  
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To resolve the underinvestment problem the firm could issue a callable bond. When the 
quality of the projects is revealed the firm can exercise the call feature thereby replacing the high 
coupon callable bond with a lower coupon bond. If in fact make whole and claw back bonds are 
used by firms to resolve the underinvestment problem then the firm’s stock price and growth 
prospects should improve (Nayar and Stock (2008)), the issuing firm’s credit risk should decrease 
and the ratings of make whole and claw back bonds should increase. If in fact make whole and claw 
back bond re-rating experience is superior to ordinary callable bond re-rating experience then this 
indicates that they are justified by refining the classic call option contract to better handle the 
underinvestment problems faced by firms that use them. 
An idea of the complexity of the issue can be gleaned from Table 1 that reports the salient 
quantitative details of the call provisions of our sample.
2
 Table 1 show that the “price” for invoking 
a call provision of any type generally increases as the credit rating decreases. Table 1 also highlights 
that the call protection period for ordinary calls is substantial, approximately three and a half years 
on average, whereas for make whole bonds it is virtually non existent, usually less than three 
months. Meanwhile the claw back provision is operative upon issue. Clearly investors are offered 
much more “protection” from ordinary call provisions than they are for claw back and make whole 
provisions.
3
 On the other hand controlling for credit rating the average call price for ordinary call 
provisions is modest whereas substantial premiums are offered for the exercise of a make whole or a 
claw back provision. Therefore it is unclear if bondholders’ view claw back and make whole bond 
provisions more favorably than ordinary call provisions because while evidently claw back and 
make whole provisions require a shorter protection period, they do require more compensation if 
exercised. 
                                               
2 The sample size of Table I is often less than the corresponding sample sizes in Tables II, III and IV as detailed later because 
details of some of the call provisions are missing from the Mergent™ fixed income database. 
3 
Interestingly this hints at the circumstances upon which the claw back and make whole bonds can be better suited to resolve 
the underinvestment problem. A firm that has an undervalued project that will shortly be revealed as good when the first results 
are in would desire a type of call provision than can be immediately exercised. 
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<< Table 1 about here >> 
 
We find interesting differences in the use of make whole and claw back provision bonds. 
Make whole bonds are used for all credit grades whereas claw back bonds are used almost 
exclusively for bonds rated below investment grade. Moreover ordinary callable bonds are most 
frequently issued by financial firms whereas make whole and claw back bonds are most frequently 
issued by industrial firms. Importantly, after applying controls for credit rating, industry, foreign 
status, bond covenants (put, sinking fund, security level and conversion features), private placement 
and exchange listing status, maturity, bond market conditions and issuing firm characteristics (size, 
leverage, liquidity, growth and profitability), we find that below investment grade make whole and 
claw back bonds have a significantly higher likelihood to upgrade and below investment grade claw 
back bonds have a significantly lower likelihood to downgrade than ordinary callable bonds. In 
other words, we find evidence that make whole and claw back call provisions genuinely confront 
the underinvestment problem better than ordinary callable bonds for the rating grades where agency 
problems tend to be most sever.  
 
2. Agency Cost Explanations of Callable Bonds 
The literature suggests that three types of call provisions can resolve the underinvestment problem, 
the classic call, make whole and claw back call provisions. A classical call option empowers the 
issuer to take advantage of bondholders by repaying the debt in advance when market yields 
decline. When interest rates decrease, the classical call option settlement amount is less than what 
the fair value of a debt would have been absent the call option. Following Kraus (1973) finance has 
largely rejected interest cost savings as an explanation for call provisions since in an efficient 
market gains to shareholders via refinancing at lower interest rates would be anticipated and 
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expropriated by bondholders in the terms of the initial call provision.  Recently Banko and Zhou 
(2010) find that ordinary call provisions are useful for hedging interest rate uncertainty but only for 
investment grade bonds. 
Instead, in the main, call provisions are supposed to exist because of agency problems such 
as the underinvestment, asymmetric information and asset substitution problems. More to the point, 
to resolve the underinvestment problem, classic callable bonds can be called once the value of the 
firm’s projects is revealed. Bodie and Taggart (1978) state that even when interest rates are such 
that bondholders are indifferent between callable and non-callable bonds, the firm’s risky projects 
can give shareholders a definite preference for callable bonds. If this explanation holds then all else 
equal callable bonds should experience more upgrade and less downgrade credit events as the good 
results of the firm’s projects are subsequently revealed. 
Thatcher (1985), Kish and Livingston (1992), Boreiko and Lombardo (2008), Jorion and 
Zhang (2010) and Eisdorfer (2011) all suggest that agency explanations as a whole can explain the 
use of call provisions. However, Crabbe and Helwege (1994) find that the confounding effects of 
maturity, default risk and varying trends in the popularity of call provisions make it difficult to 
empirically verify if any of the specific agency problems can explain the use of ordinary call 
provisions. Banko and Zhou (2010) reply to Crabbe and Helwege (1994) finding that ordinary call 
provisions are useful in dealing with a combination of underinvestment and asymmetric information 
problems rather than each agency problem in isolation. Additionally several authors provide 
explanations why firms can employ a sub optimal call policy. Mauer (1993) finds that firms can 
delay calls due to transactions costs, Longstaff and Tuckman (1994) and Mitto and Zhang (2010) 
explains that wealth transfers resulting from temporary capital structure changes can cause a sub 
optimal delay and King and Mauer (2000) observe that firms can employ a sub-optimal call policy 
for a variety of reasons. In any event Crabbe and Helwege (1994) do not find any evidence that 
callable bonds reduce the underinvestment problem alone. Specifically when controlling for credit 
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risk, maturity and trends in the use of call provisions they find that callable bonds are no more likely 
to upgrade or downgrade than non-callable bonds. 
With a make-whole call provision, the call price is not determined by a price schedule.
 
Instead as Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Gottesman and 
Roberts (2007) note make whole provisions have a call price determined by discounting the bond’s 
remaining contractual cash flows at a specified spread over a similar maturity Treasury rate. 
Therefore the call price floats inversely with Treasury rates. If exercised, the make-whole call price 
is calculated as the maximum of par value or the present value of the bond’s remaining payments. A 
primary benefit of the make-whole call provision relative to the classical call provision is that the 
floating call price virtually eliminates the incentive for the firm to call when interest rates decrease. 
Thus, make whole bondholders face little risk that their income can be expropriated due to adverse 
interest rate movements. 
Make-whole call provisions have become quite common in corporate debt over the past ten 
years.
4
 Mann and Powers (2003b) suggest that the make-whole call is useful for firms that anticipate 
a need for financial flexibility without any dependence on low economy-wide interest rates. Powers 
and Tsyplakov (2004) use a structural model to examine whether make-whole call provisions are 
fairly priced initially and conclude that make-whole call provisions are too expensive for the 
benefits that they provide. Power and Tsyplakov (2008) report that make-whole call provisions are 
significantly overpriced on average across a 10-year sample but incremental yields are decreasing in 
the later part of the sample.  
Nayer and Stock (2008) find clear evidence that stockholders do in fact benefit from issues 
of make whole bonds and suggest that make whole bonds alleviate agency costs without the use of 
expensive ordinary call provisions. Survey evidence in Mann and Powers (2003b) and Powers and 
Sarkar (2006) find that corporate executives believe make-whole call provisions offer tangible 
                                               
4 Approximately 20% of the issues in the Merrill Lynch 1-5 Year Government Corporate Index have make-whole call 
provision.   
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benefits to the firm in the form of increased financial flexibility. Thus, firms are willing to pay a 
premium in order to incorporate make-whole call provisions. However, Mann and Powers (2003a) 
and Power and Tsyplakov (2004) see little opportunity for arbitrage opportunities due to the 
incompleteness of the corporate bond market. Without arbitrage opportunities, there is no obvious 
mechanism that will drive down the incremental offer yield of make-whole call provisions. 
Make whole provisions can alleviate the underinvestment problem because it separates the 
incentive to call a bond to achieve interest cost savings from calling a bond to avoid the 
underinvestment problem. Specifically the firm can call the entire bond issue only at a call price 
determined by a yield that is set at a predetermined spread above a similar maturity treasury yield. 
This means that as interest rates decrease, the call price increases so there is little room for coupon 
cost savings due to interest rate changes. The firm is free to take on a risky project in the assurance 
that if the project subsequently proves itself, the firm can call the bond at prices consistent with the 
general level of interest rates and so avoid expropriation of the benefits of the now proven project 
by the bondholders. Once the quality of the project is revealed, stock returns improve and stock 
analysts growth estimates are upgraded (Nayar and Stock 2008) so it is not unreasonable to suspect 
that rating agencies would upgrade the credit quality of the firm’s bonds. Accordingly make whole 
bonds should experience unusually positive re-rating experience if firms use them to fund risk 
projects subject to the underinvestment problem.  
According to Fridson (1993) claw back provisions appeared in high yield offerings in 1992.
 
These clauses allow issuers to partially call a bond issue with capital raised from equity financings 
despite ordinary call limitations. Bonds with claw back provisions are also thought to alleviate the 
under investment problem. Generally, asymmetric information problems become less severe when a 
new project commences via equity investment. This means the investment decision can cause a 
wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders as bondholders benefit from a reduction in credit 
risk but still enjoy a high coupon rate set when information asymmetries were high. This can lead to 
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the underinvestment problem because managers will wish to avoid this wealth transfer and so will be 
reluctant to accept profitable projects requiring new equity financing. Claw back provisions make it 
possible for issuers to mitigate wealth transfers that result from a reduction in information 
asymmetries surrounding equity offerings as the firm can repurchase a portion of old high coupon 
bond issues at relatively low prices. Therefore bonds that contain claw back call provisions should 
on average experience unusually good re-rating experience as firms with claw back provisions 
should issue equity, thereby reducing reliance of debt in the firms’ capital structure, to finance 
valuable projects.
 
 
Goyal et al. (1998) argue that claw back provisions are designed to soften problems of 
underinvestment that are a result of changes in a firm’s information environment when the firm 
issues new equity. Consistent with this hypothesis they find that firms most likely to suffer from the 
underinvestment problem, specifically unregulated and private firms with more intangible and less 
liquid assets are the most likely firms to issue claw back bonds. Similarly Daniels et al. (2009) find 
that smaller firms with lower ratings and lower profit favor claw back bonds, precisely the kind of 
firm that will suffer most from the underinvestment problem. They also find that claw back bonds 
have a higher offering yield spread and therefore are more costly to issuers than ordinary callable 
bonds. 
In summary we find that there is no empirical evidence that ordinary callable bonds deal 
specifically with the underinvestment problem. However, we find that the theoretical justification 
for refining the call provision via make whole and claw back clauses is to relieve the 
underinvestment disincentive. Moreover, the literature claims that these bonds do help resolve the 
underinvestment problem as firms that issue make whole and claw back bonds are firms that are 
likely to face underinvestment and after issue enjoy improving growth prospects and stock prices. If 
indeed make whole and claw back provisions genuinely alleviate the underinvestment disincentive 
then bondholders as well as shareholders should benefit. Therefore the re-rating experience of 
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ordinary callable bonds, that is callable bonds without a make whole or claw back provision, can act 
as a control sample to detect whether the make whole and claw back provision bonds are dealing 
more effectively with the underinvestment problem than ordinary callable bonds. Specifically, 
bonds that contain make whole or claw back provisions should on average experience more 
upgrades and/or less downgrades than bonds employing ordinary call provisions as subsequent to 
issue, firms with make whole or claw back provisions should on average have more future 
investment opportunities that subsequently prove to be valuable to justify the improving growth 
prospects, higher stock prices and higher credit ratings.  
 
3. Data selection 
We use the Mergent® Inc’s Fixed Investment Securities Database FISD. The FISD consists of 
detailed cross sectional information on issue characteristics of all bonds that the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners had on their books as of January 1, 1995, and all bonds 
that they bought up to and including May 27, 2008. Each of the approximately 100,000 bond issues 
is identified by the ISIN number and includes information on the maturity date, offering date, rating 
date, rating, rating type, offering amount, industry code and type of call provision.  
From the FISD, we select all bonds that belong to the industrial, financial, and utility 
industries while we eliminate Treasury bonds. Therefore our sample contains corporate bonds only. 
On examining these corporate bonds for rating type we find that Duff and Phelps do not rate many 
bonds within each rating category. Moreover, virtually all bonds rated by Duff and Phelps are also 
rated by one of the other mainstream rating agencies, so we decide to neglect Duff and Phelps 
ratings. However, we consider all Standard and Poor’s, Moodys and Fitch rated bonds because they 
rate a large number of bonds in all industry categories. Of these we only keep those with a rating 
date within one year of the offering date to ensure that the bond under study has the same rating it 
had on the date it was offered. Moreover, we cut off the sample selection after May 27, 2007 to 
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assure that all bonds in the sample have at least one year of aging so that bond rating agencies have 
the opportunity to adjust the ratings for the impact of new investment. 
To report the characteristics of the sample by rating we convert Standard and Poors, Moodys 
and Fitch letter ratings into numerical equivalents according to Table 2. Notice that all rating 
agencies have an almost identical rating system with eight broad rating categories, six of which are 
sub divided into three shades of ratings. At the lower end there appears to be a minor deviation 
where Standard and Poors has one lower rating D and Fitch has two additional lower ratings of DD 
and DDD than Moodys so that in total Moodys has 21, Standard and Poors 22 and Fitch 24 ratings. 
However this deviation is minor as very few bonds have a rating of D, DD or DDD within one year 
of issue so we simply assign the same numerical rating of one to Moodys’ rating of C, Standard and 
Poors’ ratings of C and D, and Fitch’s ratings of C, D, DD and DDD. Only very few bonds have no 
rating that we have coded as NR. 
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
Often the rating agencies disagree as to the rating of a bond usually by one shade of credit 
rating. However, the point of this paper is to determine whether the type of financial contract is able 
to genuinely resolve the underinvestment problem by examining the change in a given bond’s rating 
over time rather than level of the original rating at the date of issue. Therefore we can avoid issues 
regarding the rating level when aggregating the sample of Standard and Poors, Moodys and Fitch 
rated bonds, as we do not have to “average” the ratings of the three agencies. Instead, we take the 
most recent after issue rating of Standard and Poors, Moodys or Fitch. In the case of “ties” we 
prioritize Standard and Poors, then Moodys and finally Fitch as these are the rankings of the most 
common rating agencies on the FISD. 
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From this initial selection of bonds we select three sub samples, the make whole, claw back 
and ordinary callable bond sub samples. The make whole sub sample consists of bonds from the 
above selection that have make whole call provision but do not contain a claw back provision. 
Similarly the claw back sub sample consists of bonds that contain a claw back provision but do not 
contain a make whole provision. Finally ordinary callable bonds have call provisions but do not 
contain make whole or claw back provisions. We also delete all ordinary callable bonds of firms 
that have make whole or claw back bonds. This helps ensure that the otherwise callable bond 
sample can act as a control sample since make whole and claw back provisions are supposed to 
resolve the underinvestment problem for the firm.  
Banko and Zhou (2010) and Crabbe and Helwege (1994) note that the use of call provisions 
vary through time so to ensure that there is no difference in the trend in the use of make whole, claw 
back and otherwise callable bonds we plot the number of bonds by offering year and call provision 
type in Figure 1. This figure shows that prior to the 1995 offering year the database is dominated by 
otherwise callable bonds except for a single spike of make whole bonds in 1989. In contrast, from 
1995 onwards a fairly large number of bonds of each type are issued in each year. As the 
distribution of offering dates by call provision type is so different prior to 1995 than in subsequent 
offering years we think that the use of bonds issued prior to 1995 will produce a trend bias to our 
results so we decided to include only bonds that were offered in 1995 or later in our final sample. 
 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
These selection procedures leave a total sample of 16,612 callable bonds consisting of 5,263 make 
whole, 3,699 claw back and 7,650 ordinary callable bonds. Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the details of the 
make whole, claw back and otherwise callable sub samples.   
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<<Table 3, 4 and 5 about here>> 
 
We make three observations concerning our sample as reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5. First 
examining the sub samples of bonds by industry, we note that while the make whole and claw back 
bonds are dominated by the industrial category, the ordinary callable bonds are dominated by the 
financial industry. Moreover there are few claw back provision bonds in the utility industry. In 
contrast all types of callable bonds are well represented in the industrial category. Since utility 
bonds are subject to high regulatory risk that is in large part absent in industrial bonds and the risks 
associated with financial bonds are different than the risks associated with industrial bonds, we must 
find a way to control for industry effects so that we are confident that the results will be due to the 
use of the call provisions rather than differences in industry categories. 
Second we examine the sample by credit rating. With the exception of financial bonds, make 
whole bonds are higher rated and claw back bonds are lower rated than ordinary callable bonds. 
Specifically, for non-financial bonds the average claw back provision bond has a rating of B and the 
average make whole call provision bond has a rating of BBB+, slightly more or less than one whole 
credit rating category lower and higher respectively than the typically BBB- rated ordinary callable 
industrial bond. It is gratifying to note that except for the very high ratings, AA+ and AA, and for 
the very low ratings CCC- and below, the granularity of the ordinary callable industrial bond data is 
very fine. This means that when we refine the sample by broad credit ratings we are able to find a 
reasonable sample size, at least 35 or more for the ordinary callable industrial bonds, and 139 or 
more for all ordinary callable bonds to act as a control sample all broad categories of credit ratings.  
Third, we examine the sub samples by maturity. We note that ordinary callable bonds and 
make whole bonds have an average maturity of 15 years and 13 years respectively, which is higher 
than 9 years average maturity for the claw back provision bonds. However, Bali and Skinner (2006) 
note that the average maturity of corporate bonds typically declines with credit rating and evidently 
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much of this difference in average maturity is accounted for by the differences in average credit 
rating. For example, examining the average maturity for the B rating, otherwise callable and make 
whole bonds typically have a much lower average maturity of 8 to 11 years that is much closer to 
the 9 years average maturity for the claw back provision B rated bonds. Overall the sample that we 
select appears capable of providing the data necessary to statistically test to see whether the re-
rating experience of make whole and claw back provision bonds are different than ordinary callable 
bonds. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Relieving the underinvestment problem should not only improve earnings prospects for the firm but 
also improve the credit rating of their bonds, as more valuable projects will be accepted. Wider 
economic events can swamp the positive re-rating effect, but still if these provisions are resolving 
the underinvestment problem then bonds employing these provisions if not enjoying more upgrade 
events then they should at least enjoy less downgrade events than otherwise similar ordinary 
callable bonds. 
The literature clearly specifies that call behavior is influenced by bond provisions (e.g. King 
and Mauer 2000, Mitchell 1991) and listing, bond market and firm effects (e.g. Banko and Zhou 
2010, Nayar and Stock 2008, Crabbe and Helwege 1994, Thatcher 1985). Therefore we must 
control for all of these confounding influences. The FISD contains variables that indicate the 
presence of the full range of bond covenants including put, conversion and sinking fund features. 
Additionally the security level is specified in the FISD that we convert to a seven point numerical 
scale as specified in Table 6 ranking from the highest security level of seven for senior secured 
bonds to one for the junior subordinate bonds. There are also indicator variables for exchange listing 
and for private placement of the bond issue. As bond market and firm level data is not available 
from the FISD we employ two additional sources of information. Bond market information is 
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collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Table H6. We also employ the Q database 
provided by Capital IQ. The Q database contains financial statement information that can be linked 
to the FISD bond information via the nine-digit CUSIP numbers.
5
 
We are faced with the task of determining whether or not the upgrade and downgrade 
frequencies for make whole and claw back bonds are different than the upgrade and downgrade 
frequencies for ordinary callable bonds. This zero, one specification of the investigation naturally 
leads to a probit model the full specification of which is as follows. 
 
Where  
YUi = 1 if there is an upgrade and 0 if no change in rating within one year of the rating date 
CBi = 1 if the bond is a claw back bond, 0 otherwise 
MWi = 1 if the bond is a make whole bond, 0 otherwise 
UTLi = 1 if the bond is a utility bond, 0 otherwise 
OCutli = 1 if the bond is an ordinary callable utility industry bond, 0 otherwise 
FINi = 1 if the bond is a finance industry bond, 0 otherwise  
OCfini = 1 if the bond is an ordinary callable financial industry bond, 0 otherwise 
YANKEEi = 1 if the bond is a Yankee bond, 0 otherwise 
PUTi = 1 if the bond is a putable bond, 0 otherwise 
SFi = 1 if the bond is a sinking fund bond, 0 otherwise 
SLi = 7 to 1 from the highest to lowest security level as specified in Table 6 
Converti = 1 if the bond is a convertible bond, 0 otherwise 
                                               
5 In performing the match of the Q data with the FISD database we gratefully acknowledge expert help from the staff of Q data. 
All of the subsequent matches made by CUSIPS were double checked by matching company names. 
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Privatei = 1 if the bond is a private placement bond, 0 otherwise 
Listi = 1 if the bond is exchange listed, 0 otherwise 
MATi is the at issue maturity of the bond measured in years 
LEVELi is the level of the Treasury term structure as proxied by the one year Treasury interest rate  
SLOPEi is the slope of the Treasury term structure as proxied by the difference between the ten-year 
and one-year Treasury interest rate 
SIZEi is the log of issuing firm’s assets  
DAi is the debt to assets ratio of the issuing firm  
CRi is the current ratio of the issuing firm 
CAPrevi is the ratio of capital expenditure to revenue of the issuing firm 
ROA(0)i is the issue year return on assets of the issuing firm 
ROA(-1)i is the prior year return on assets of the issuing firm 
ROA(-2)i is the two years prior return on assets of the issuing firm 
 
We will run two sets of probit regressions, the first set above examines the upgrade 
experience and the second set examines the downgrade experience. Specifically, the second set of 
probit regressions will be the same as above except that the dependent variable will be YD where 
one represents a downgrade and zero if there is no rating change within one year of the rating date. 
These regressions are done in sets that control for the broad rating category of the bond as well as 
its’ investment grade (BBB- and above) and below investment grade (BB+ and below) status.  
Industry dummies FIN and UTL control for industry effects. By including dummy variables 
for both the call provision type and for the industry category, we are also implicitly assuming that 
the upgrade and downgrade likelihood of the types of call provisions are the same across industries. 
This may not hold in the case of ordinary callable bonds since Table 5 reveals that ordinary callable 
bonds have a larger concentration (76.29%) in the finance industry than for make whole (Table 2, 
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21.09%) and claw back (Table 3, 4.49%) provision bonds. Moreover, Table 3 reports that claw back 
provision bonds are almost exclusively industrial (92.73%) with few financial (4.49%) and even 
fewer utility (2.78%) bonds. It is possible that finance and utility bonds have more (or less) stable 
ratings than industrial bonds and the difference in industry profile of ordinary callable bonds can 
taint the interpretation of the call provision MW and CB coefficients.
6
 Therefore we include 
interaction variables OCfin and OCutl for ordinary callable financial and utility bonds respectively 
and as a result interpret the CB and MW coefficients as the differential likelihood of a rating change 
relative to ordinary callable industrial bonds.  
Eight variables control for the particular characteristics of a given bond issue. We include 
the YANKEE dummy variable because foreign bonds can have a different re-rating experience than 
domestic bonds since they are more exposed to international factors than domestic bonds. Put, 
sinking fund, security level and conversion feature variables are included because changes in market 
conditions effect the value of these covenants and therefore could either confound the influence of 
market conditions on the likelihood of an up or downgrade or directly influence rating agency rating 
decisions.
7
 We include private placement and exchange listing status as control variables because 
the presence of make whole and claw back provisions, rather than allowing the stockholders to 
capture the full value of +NPV projects, could be used by weak credit firms to access financing not 
otherwise available. In fact Goyal et al (1998) finds that many firms that issue claw back bonds are 
private firms with low credit ratings, just the sort of firm that can have restrictive access to the 
public debt market. Finally Barnea et al. (1980) argue that short-term bonds are equally capable of 
resolving agency problems and information asymmetries as callable bonds so including short-term 
                                               
6 Indeed evidently it does, as the interaction variables OCfin and OCutl are frequently significant at the 1% level. Typically the 
interaction variables report a different re-rating experience than the industrial category. For example, our results show that 
finance bonds have a higher likelihood of an upgrade than industrial bonds. Without controlling for this interaction effect, we 
would be comparing claw back bonds that are basically industrial bonds with ordinary callable bonds that are typically 
financial bonds and likely concluding that claw backs upgrade less frequently than ordinary callable bonds when in fact it is the 
case that industrial bonds upgrade less frequently than financial bonds. 
7 For example, the decision not to downgrade is a decision that can be influenced by a strong security level provision during a 
poor economic climate. 
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bonds without any control for maturity effects can confound the evidence of whether make whole 
and claw back provisions can resolve the underinvestment problem. Rather than arbitrarily cull our 
sample for “short term bonds” we choose instead to include bonds of all maturities and include the 
initial maturity of the bonds MAT as a control variable.  
The current level and slope of the term structure of interest rates are summary statistics of 
the current state of the overall bond market that can influence the likelihood that a given bond can 
up or down grade. For instance, as the level of the term structure LEVEL rises new projects become 
more expensive and are less likely to be accepted so the likelihood of an upgrade can decrease. 
Additionally, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1997) find that an increase 
in the slope of the term structure foreshadow improvements in real economic activity while Estrella 
and Mishkin (1998) find that decrease in the slope of the term structure foreshadows recessions. 
Therefore as the slope of the term structure increases the likelihood that a given bond will upgrade 
can increase, as economic conditions are more likely to improve. We proxy the level of the term 
structure as the one year Treasury interest rate and the slope of the term structure as difference 
between the ten year and the one year Treasury interest rate.  
We include seven firm level variables as either control variables or because they can be an 
alterative explanation for the change in rating of the firm’s debt. Firm size is included as a control 
variable because Goyal et al. (1998) show that the presence of claw back provisions is related to 
firm size. Bonds can be re-rated for many reasons that are related to the general condition of the 
firm such as the firm’s debt burden, liquidity, growth and profitability. Therefore we include proxies 
for the issuing firm’s debt burden as the ratio of debt to assets DA, liquidity as the current ratio CR, 
growth as the ratio of capital expenditures to revenue CAPrev and profitability as the firm’s return 
on assets ROA. Moreover a track record of profitability rather than a single year’s result could cause 
a rating change so we include the ROA of the issue year and two years prior to the issue year. 
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In summary, equation (1) says that at date t, the probability that a given callable bond will 
upgrade (YUt = 1), or maintain its’ rating (YUt = 0) relative to the base case (ordinary callable 
industrial bonds) is a function F of a constant, its’ call provision (make whole, claw back), industry 
category (financial, utility), whether the bond is a foreign bond, the presence of covenants (put, 
sinking fund, security level and conversion features), its’ issue status (exchange listed, private 
placement), the maturity of the bond, the level and slope of the term structure and the characteristics 
of the issuing firm (size, debt to asset ratio, current ratio, capital expenditures to revenue ratio and 
current and past profitability). The above equation is estimated via a maximum likelihood probit 
regression rather than OLS since the dependent variable is dichotomous, only being able to take the 
value of one or zero. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. Table 7 reports the 
result of (1) for upgrades and Table 8 reports the results of the corresponding regression for 
downgrades. 
 
<< Tables 7 and 8 about here>> 
 
Looking at the last column, the below investment grade category of Tables 7 and 8, we see 
that claw back bonds are more likely to upgrade and are less likely to downgrade than ordinary 
callable bonds. Moreover make whole bonds are more likely to upgrade than ordinary callable 
industrial bonds. All of these results are statistically significant. Clearly there is strong evidence that 
below investment grade claw back and make whole bonds have an exceptionally good re-rating 
experience that persists even when we control for industry, bond market condition, issue and firm 
characteristics. 
In contrast, we are unable to reliably estimate the re-rating experience of investment grade 
claw back bonds as Table 4 reveals that there are so very few bonds of this type. Additionally, we 
see that investment grade make whole bonds are more likely to downgrade than industrial ordinary 
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callable bonds. Clearly we have no evidence that for the investment grade, claw back and make 
whole bonds have an unusually good re-rating experience.  
These conclusions are reinforced when we examine the re-rating experience by broad rating 
category. For claw back bonds, we find that B rated bonds, which represents more than 76% of all 
claw back bonds, are more likely to upgrade than ordinary callable industrial bonds. Moreover BB 
rated bonds are less likely to downgrade. Both of these results are highly significant so surely are 
not due to mere chance. We see that for make whole below investment grade bonds, B bonds are 
more likely to upgrade. In contrast, the overall downgrade experience for below investment grade 
make whole bonds is neutral because while BB bonds are less likely to downgrade, B rated make 
whole bonds are more likely to downgrade.  Finally we note that A rated make whole bonds are 
more likely to downgrade and are less likely to upgrade than ordinary callable industrial bonds but 
as we report above, when aggregated by investment grade category the overall effect is neutral.  
Overall we find clear evidence that claw back and make whole bonds do in fact appear to 
enjoy an exceptionally good re-rating experience but this effect is concentrated in the below 
investment grade category, just where we would expect agency problems to be most prevalent. We 
note that these findings are robust to firm and issue characteristics as well as industry effects and 
bond market conditions.
 8
 
Next we examine industry effects. Generally speaking, utility bonds UTL seem to have more 
stable ratings than ordinary callable bonds.  Below investment grade utilities are less likely to 
downgrade and for utilities that are also ordinary callable OCutl they are less likely to upgrade if 
they are investment grade and are less likely to downgrade if they are below investment grade. 
                                               
8 We conduct a variety of robustness checks. First, we examine the re-rating experience of make whole, claw back and ordinary 
callable bonds for the industry category only. Second, we exclude zero coupon and variable rate bonds. We prefer to include 
zero and variable rate bonds as reported in the text because this increases sample size by 1,763 and it is not clear if the fact that 
a bond is zero or variable rate it will affect the re-rating experience. Third to check on the stability of the coefficients we split 
our sample into two equal sized data sets by assigning all even observations in one set and all odd observations in another data 
set. These results also clearly show that claw back and make whole bonds have a significantly better re-rating experience for 
the below investment grades. For make whole bonds the investment grade experience proves again to be no different than 
ordinary callable bonds. These results are not included for the sake of brevity, but are available from the corresponding author 
upon request.  
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Financial bonds FIN appear to have a good re-rating experience that is moderated when we examine 
the performance of financial bonds that are also ordinary callable. Specifically, below investment 
grade financial bonds FIN are more likely to upgrade and investment grade FIN bonds are less 
likely to downgrade than ordinary callable industrial bonds. However, when a FIN bond is also an 
ordinary callable bond OCfin this good re-rating experience is moderated as these bonds are more 
likely to downgrade and less likely to upgrade, the only exception is for investment grade OCfin 
where they are more likely to upgrade.  
Except for below investment grade bonds, Yankee bonds do not have a different re-rating 
experience than domestic bonds. For AA and BBB broad rating categories Yankee bonds are either 
less likely to upgrade or downgrade and B rated bonds are more likely to upgrade than domestic 
bonds.  Aggregating by investment and below investment grades however, the investment grade 
experience of Yankee bonds is no different than the experience of domestic bonds but the good up 
grading experience of below investment grade bonds persist.  
In most cases bond covenants appear as “sweeteners” to entice bondholder’s to invest in 
them because most types of bonds with covenants tend to have significantly poorer re-rating 
experience when compared to bonds without these covenants. Convertible investment grade bonds 
are less likely to upgrade and are more likely to downgrade than nonconvertible bonds. Sinking 
fund bonds are less likely to upgrade and below investment grade sinking fund bonds are more 
likely to downgrade than bonds without sinking funds. For the investment grades, the higher the 
level the security the less likely the bond will upgrade and the more likely the bond will downgrade. 
For below investment grades, the more security the more unstable the rating as below investment 
grade bonds with a high level of security are more likely to upgrade as well as downgrade. Only put 
features are an exception where the put feature is associated with an exceptionally good re-rating 
experience. Even here however this good re-rating experience apply only for the below investment 
grade as these bonds are more likely to upgrade than bonds without put features. 
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We find that the ratings of issues that are privately placed are more stable, being less likely 
to upgrade and downgrade for all rating categories. This result is remarkably strong and significant. 
Meanwhile exchange listed bonds that are also below investment grade are more likely to upgrade 
and less likely to downgrade. Investment grade exchange listed bonds however, have more unstable 
ratings being more likely to upgrade as well as downgrade than bonds that are not exchange listed. 
Barnea et al. (1980) argue that short-term bonds are equally capable of resolving agency 
problems as callable bonds so we are also interested to see if the maturity of callable bonds has an 
effect on the re-rating experience. Interestingly we do find a maturity effect where investment grade 
bonds are more likely to upgrade and below investment grade bonds are less likely to upgrade with 
maturity. This is consistent with Barnea et al. (1980) since relatively weak credits do not issue short 
term bonds and tend to rely on longer term bonds and hence the relatively poor re-rating experience 
of below investment grade longer term bonds. 
We examine the influence of bond market conditions on callable bond re-rating experience. 
We do not find much evidence that the level or the slope of the term structure affects the re-rating 
experience of bonds when aggregating the results by investment or below investment grade status. 
The sole exception is that below investment grade bonds are less likely to downgrade as the level 
rises.  These results suggest that bond-rating agencies make re-rating decisions based on longer-
term fundamental factors rather than current bond market conditions, a result that is consistent with 
Amato and Furfine (2004). 
Looking at firm level control variables, we find that the larger the firm the more likely bond 
issues are to upgrade or downgrade suggesting perhaps that larger firms are more actively 
monitored by rating agencies. Higher debt burdens foreshadow poor re-rating experience as the 
higher the total debt to asset ratio DA the less likely a bond will upgrade and the more likely a bond 
will downgrade. Higher profitability on the other hand foreshadows a good re-rating experience as 
the higher the current ROA the more likely a bond will upgrade and the less likely a bond will 
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downgrade. There appears to be a timing element to the relation between profitability and re-rating 
experience as prior years return on assets ROA in inversely related to a good re-rating experience.  
For instance, the higher the profitability one year prior to issue ROA(-1) the more likely a bond will 
downgrade and for below investment grade bonds, the less likely they will upgrade. The effect of 
higher growth on the re-rating experience appears related to the original credit rating. For below 
investment grade bonds the higher CAPrev the less likely the bond will downgrade but for 
investment grade bonds the higher CAPrev the less likely to the bond will upgrade. Finally short-
term liquidity when aggregated by investment vs. below investment grade is not related to future re-
rating experience suggesting that re-rating is related to longer-term structural problems. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
To date it is not clear whether the make whole and claw back provisions are economically justified. 
We know from Banko and Zhou (2010) that ordinary calls can alleviate the combination of 
asymmetric information and underinvestment problems. Other empirical suggests that recent 
refinements to the call provision, specifically the make whole and claw back call provision, are 
explained as methods to resolve the underinvestment problem that is already at least partly resolved 
by ordinary calls. Specifically stockholders appear to benefit from higher earnings and growth 
subsequent to the issue of make whole provision bonds (Nayar and Stock 2008) and firms that issue 
claw back bonds are more likely to have problems with underinvestment (Goyal et al.1998). 
However if these types of callable bonds do in fact alleviate the underinvestment problem, then 
bondholders should also benefit, otherwise the supposed benefit to the stockholders can represent a 
repatriation of value already extracted by bondholders with no improvement in the value of the firm. 
We examine the re-rating experience of callable bonds to see if the re-rating experience of make 
whole and claw back provision bonds is different from the re-rating experience of ordinary callable 
bonds. We suggest that if these provisions genuinely confront the underinvestment problem in a 
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way that is superior to ordinary call provisions then make whole and claw back provision bonds 
should share in the benefits from the resolution of the underinvestment problem. Specifically as the 
firm will be encouraged to accept projects leading to higher growth and earnings, make whole and 
claw back provision bonds will be more likely to upgrade and/or less likely to downgrade than 
otherwise similar ordinary callable bonds that do not employ these provisions.  
We find evidence that supports this theory for claw back and make whole bonds rated below 
investment grade, just where agency problems tend to be most severe. Specifically when we control 
for original rating, industry effects, foreign bond status, bond covenants, listing and maturity effects, 
economic conditions in the bond market and firm effects such as size, debt burden, liquidity, growth 
potential and profitability, we find a significantly higher likelihood that below investment grade 
claw back and make whole bonds will upgrade and a significant lower likelihood that below 
investment grade claw back bonds will downgrade than ordinary callable bonds. Clearly this 
suggests that the make whole and claw back refinements to the ordinary call provisions are justified 
as methods to deal more effectively with the under investment problem at least for bonds that are 
originally rated below investment grade. 
Moreover we find industry effects where financial bonds have a better re-rating experience 
and utility bonds have a more stable re-rating experience than industrial bonds. Many bond market 
covenants, specifically the conversion and sinking fund features and the security provision, have a 
poor re-rating experience suggesting that these sorts of covenants are used as sweeteners to 
compensate investors for buying risky bonds. Several control proxies suggest that certain types of 
bonds attract more attention from the rating agencies. Specifically larger firms that list their bonds 
on an exchange tend to have a more unstable re-rating experience having both a greater likelihood 
of upgrades and downgrades, as opposed to smaller firms that privately place their bonds that have a 
stable re-rating experience with a lower likelihood of an upgrade or a downgrade. Rating agencies 
do not appear to re-rate based on short-term factors such as bond market conditions and the firm’s 
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liquidity. The firm’s current profitability improves but the firm’s debt burden deteriorates the bond’s 
re-rating experience while the effect of the firm’s growth on the bond’s re-rating experience 
depends upon the grade of the debt. Finally the original maturity of a bond is related to its’ re-rating 
experience where investment grade longer term debt is more likely to upgrade but longer term 
below investment grade bonds are less likely to upgrade. 
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Table 1. Call provision specifications   
This table reports the quantitative details of make whole, claw back and ordinary call provisions of the sample. Note that make 
whole and ordinary callable bonds have a call protection period where initially the firm cannot make a make whole or an 
ordinary call for the period of time indicated but a claw back bond can be immediately clawed back. Also effective life is the 
percentage of the bonds scheduled life where the indicated call provision applies. The claw back percentage refers to the 
percentage of the original issue that can be clawed back. Finally, claw back and ordinary callable bonds can be called at 
specified prices whereas make whole bonds are called at the indicated spread over a comparable maturity sovereign bond. NR 
stands for “not rated”. 
1 There is very little variation in the claw back percentage. Over 80% of all claw back bonds in our sample can claw back 35% 
of the original issue. 
2Average of initial call price. Also the average does not include the call price of 152 zero coupon bonds as the call price is often 
far below par. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating
 
Make Whole Claw Back Ordinary Call 
 Call 
Prot 
(years) 
Effective 
life (%) 
Spread 
(basis 
points) 
Effective 
life (%) 
Claw 
Back 
Price 
Claw Back 
Percentage
1 
Call 
Prot 
(years) 
Effective 
life (%) 
Call 
Price
2 
AAA 0.11 98.18 12.26 NA NA NA 1.65 81.85 100.07 
AA 0.19 97.60 14.45 NA NA NA 2.97 76.84 100.30 
A 0.14 98.17 19.39 20.25 109.08 36.75 3.99 76.82 100.08 
BBB 0.14 97.85 26.02 29.49 107.83 34.33 4.18 75.43 100.39 
BB 0.13 96.18 43.01 32.98 108.69 34.74 4.77 63.43 102.16 
B 0.08 74.39 49.56 24.83 109.75 34.75 3.87 59.02 103.11 
Below B 0.45 47.71 46.67 19.32 110.56 35.70 3.00 63.40 103.07 
NR 0.02 99.85 23.33 33.56 111.12 35.00 4.03 79.71 100.05 
Avg. 0.14 97.07 25.80 25.20 109.71 34.86 3.67 74.63 100.55 
Obs. 5,025 5,231 5,035 3,699 3,624 3,670 7,588 7,303 7,392 
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Table 2. Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Numerical Equivalents 
This table reports how we assign a numerical rating to Standard and Poors, Moodys and Fitch letter ratings. These numerical 
ratings are used to measure the average rating by industry, maturity and by bond type.  
 
S&P Moodys Fitch # 
AAA Aaa AAA 21 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 20 
AA Aa/Aa2 AA 19 
AA- Aa3 AA- 18 
A+ A1 A+ 17 
A A/A2 A 16 
A- A3 A- 15 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 14 
BBB Baa/Baa2 BBB 13 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 12 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 11 
BB Ba/Ba2 BB 10 
BB- Ba3 BB- 9 
B+ B1 B+ 8 
B B2 B 7 
B- B3 B- 6 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 5 
CCC Caa2 CCC 4 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 3 
CC Ca CC 2 
C/D C C/D/DD 
/DDD 
1 
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Table 3. Sample Characteristics of Make Whole Call Provision Bonds 
This table reports the sample characteristics of bonds that contain a make whole call provision but does not contain a claw back 
provision. All bonds are rated by Standard and Poors, Moodys or Fitch within one year of the offering date and have been 
offered from 1995 to 2007. This sample does not contain government bonds. 
 Industrial Financial Utility Total Sample 
Rating Sample Maturity Sample Maturity Sample Maturity Sample Maturity 
AAA 33 19.29 13 11.17 20 13.57 66 15.96 
AA+ 6 18.75 3 21.73 4 15.01 13 18.29 
AA 59 16.48 32 16.01 10 17.42 101 16.43 
AA- 71 14.28 35 11.56 49 19.70 155 15.38 
A+ 203 15.52 95 12.76 68 15.92 366 14.88 
A 299 15.36 90 17.39 136 15.08 525 15.64 
A- 291 12.84 121 15.41 136 15.40 548 14.04 
BBB+ 422 14.17 182 11.77 268 13.82 872 13.56 
BBB 582 13.21 289 10.87 243 13.60 1114 12.69 
BBB- 422 11.98 205 9.97 190 13.63 817 11.86 
BB+ 201 10.15 25 12.37 65 13.41 291 11.07 
BB 128 8.66 9 7.80 30 9.16 167 8.70 
BB- 62 8.78 3 6.83 24 8.85 89 8.73 
B+ 33 9.70 2 22.06 12 8.14 47 9.83 
B 35 7.92 1 6.92 12 9.39 48 8.27 
B- 21 7.57 3 7.36 2 10.04 26 7.74 
CCC+ 10 8.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 10 8.71 
CCC 4 8.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 8.95 
Below CCC 1 6.88 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 6.88 
NR 0 0.00 2 18.53 1 10.02 3 15.69 
Grand Total 2,883 13.01 1,110 12.26 1,270 14.09 5,263 13.11 
Percentage 54.78  21.09  24.13  100.00  
Avg. Rating BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 
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Table 4. Sample Characteristics of Claw Back Provision Bonds 
This table reports the sample characteristics of bonds that contain a claw back provision but does not contain a make whole call 
provision. All bonds are rated by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch within one year of the offering date and have been 
offered from 1995 to 2007. This sample does not contain government bonds. 
 Industrial Financial Utility Total Sample 
Rating Number Maturity Number Maturity Number Maturity Number Maturity 
A- 4 10.05 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 10.05 
BBB- 3 9.94 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 9.94 
BB+ 49 8.51 2 8.52 1 9.23 52 8.53 
BB 107 8.97 16 9.52 7 8.80 130 9.03 
BB- 241 8.78 21 8.06 8 9.31 270 8.74 
B+ 586 8.85 51 8.56 16 9.30 653 8.84 
B 887 8.90 27 8.49 27 8.87 941 8.89 
B- 1167 8.87 29 8.79 29 9.24 1225 8.87 
CCC+ 249 8.35 18 9.33 7 7.29 274 8.39 
CCC 91 8.52 1 10.04 8 8.56 100 8.54 
CCC- 33 7.36 1 2.64 0 0.00 34 7.22 
CC 8 7.32 0 0.00 0 0.00 8 7.32 
Below CC 4 6.21 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 6.21 
NR 1 9.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 9.04 
Grand Total 3,430 8.80 166 8.68 103 8.94 3,699 8.80 
Percentage 92.73  4.49  2.78  100.00  
Avg. Rating B B B B 
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Table 5. Sample Characteristics of Otherwise Callable Bonds 
This table reports the sample characteristics of bonds of firms that have issued an ordinary callable bond and have not issued a 
bond that contains a make whole or claw back provision. All bonds are rated by Standard and Poors, Moodys or Fitch within 
one year of the offering date and have been offered from 1995 to 2007. This sample does not contain government bonds. 
 Industrial Financial Utility Total Sample 
Rating Sample Maturity Sample Maturity Sample Maturity Sample Maturity 
AAA 176 11.95 212 8.76 15 21.70 403 10.63 
AA+ 1 5.02 311 14.15 0 0.00 312 14.12 
AA 6 29.03 685 13.59 2 35.02 693 13.79 
AA- 28 17.88 778 11.91 7 32.84 813 12.29 
A+ 33 12.82 634 16.73 16 31.28 683 16.89 
A 389 19.41 1491 15.61 21 35.14 1901 16.60 
A- 21 18.72 468 17.78 32 31.98 521 18.69 
BBB+ 21 21.97 284 18.03 28 32.40 333 19.49 
BBB 47 19.64 411 14.79 36 25.83 494 16.06 
BBB- 50 19.85 287 13.88 31 30.51 368 16.09 
BB+ 60 18.06 85 15.29 17 18.28 162 16.63 
BB 45 13.39 55 13.03 5 22.29 105 13.63 
BB- 99 12.31 23 18.44 7 18.16 129 13.72 
B+ 119 10.80 31 11.30 10 18.03 160 11.35 
B 173 11.46 29 11.55 6 6.60 208 11.34 
B- 169 9.98 24 12.90 3 8.12 196 10.31 
CCC+ 74 8.52 3 4.01 0 0.00 77 8.35 
CCC 42 9.64 4 6.81 1 3.04 47 9.26 
CCC- 15 10.17 0 0.00 0 0.00 15 10.17 
CC 6 8.45 2 5.98 0 0.00 8 7.83 
Below CC 2 5.19 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 5.19 
NR 1 5.01 19 21.71 0 0.00 20 20.88 
Grand Total 1,577 14.36 5,836 14.76 237 27.29 7,650 15.06 
Percentage 20.61  76.29  3.10  100.00  
Avg. Rating BBB- A BBB+ A- 
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Table 6. This table reports the numerical values corresponding to the security level (SL) 
 
Security Level # 
  
Senior Secured 7 
  
Senior 6 
  
Senior Subordinate 5 
  
None 4 
  
Subordinate 3 
  
Junior 2 
  
Junior Subordinate 1 
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Table 7. Regression Results-UP grades 
This table reports the result of the probit regression. YU is a dummy variable where one represents a bond experiencing an 
upgrade and zero no change at the next re-rating event within one year after issue. MW, CB, OCfin, OCutl, FIN, 
UTL,YANKEE, PUT, SF, Convert, Private, List are dummy variables where one represents respectively a make whole, a claw 
back, an otherwise callable, an otherwise callable financial, an otherwise callable utility, a financial, an utility and a Yankee 
bond, a putable, a sinking fund, a convertible, a privately placed, an exchange listed bond otherwise zero. Moreover SL is the 
security level of the bond, MAT represents the maturity of a given bond, LEVEL is the one year Treasury yield, SLOPE is the 
slope of the Treasury yield curve and the Size, DA (debt to assets ratio), CR (current ratio), CAPrev (capital expenditures to 
revenue ratio) and ROA (return on assets in the issue year and one and two years prior) are variables that represent the 
characteristics of the issuing firm. The MW and CB coefficients represent the likelihood that the corresponding bond will 
upgrade relative to the base case of a domestic ordinary callable industrial bond. Standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity are reported below each coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% level  
 AA A BBB BB B IG BIG 
Cons -12.810
*** 
2.096 -4.304
*** 
-4.600
*** 
-4.438
*** 
-1.626
** 
-3.482
*** 
 1.335 1.406 0.953 1.258 0.065 0.733 0.750 
CB N/A N/A N/A -0.518 1.053
*** 
N/A 0.362
** 
 N/A N/A N/A 0.321 0.070 N/A 0.171 
MW       0.065 -0.752
*** 
-0.620 -0.041 1.013
*** 
-0.193 0.405
** 
 3.729 0.258 0.347 0.300 0.200 0.177 0.176 
UTL      -5.135
***
 0.110 0.508
***
 0.266 0.175 0.202 0.075 
 1.566 0.240 0.185 0.175 0.176 0.133 0.108 
OCutl -36.429
*** 
-4.644
***
 -5.013
***
 -0.116 -4.247
**
 -3.759
***
 -0.184 
 7.773 0.518 0.605 0.554 2.181 0.447 0.498 
FIN      -21.670
***
 -0.523
**
 0.190 1.400
***
 0.459
**
 -0.212 0.554
***
 
 7.353 0.220 0.201 0.242 0.231 0.141 0.148 
OCfin 23.884
*** 
0.747
***
 0.403 -1.897
***
 -1.221
**
 1.185
*** 
-1.304
*** 
 5.457 0.278 0.460 0.551 0.595 0.231 0.336 
YANKEE -50.595
***
 0.080 -3.271
***
 0.091 0.782
***
 0.060 0.522
***
 
 15.647 0.318 0.382 0.343 0.168 0.245 0.144 
Put -27.640
***
 -0.821
**
 0.044 -0.079 0.730
***
 -0.243 0.578
***
 
 4.702 0.346 0.256 0.464 0.265 0.258 0.195 
SF -56.577
***
 -3.200
***
 -3.015
***
 -4.360
***
 -4.195 -3.081
***
 -4.996
***
 
 7.062 0.362 0.333 0.377 2.951 0.676 0.705 
SL -2.836
***
 -0.466
***
 -0.018 0.865
***
 0.249
***
 -0.168 0.279
***
 
 0.305 0.123 0.171 0.158 0.007 0.100 0.093 
Convert -39.011
***
 -0.049 -8.193
***
 0.117 0.856
***
 -0.880
**
 0.119 
 12.199 0.358 1.169 0.456 0.169 0.410 0.228 
Private N/A N/A -2.680
***
 -2.765
***
 N/A -2.392
***
 -4.834
***
 
 N/A N/A 0.285 0.240 N/A 0.777 0.699 
List 20.140
**
 -0.240 0.578 -0.435
**
 0.256
**
 1.061
***`
 0.169
**
 
 9.195 0.526 0.428 0.196 0.110 0.307 0.086 
MAT 0.030
***
 0.010
***
 0.008
**
 -0.020
***
 -0.018
***
 0.011
***
 -0.014
***
 
 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.003 
LEVEL       0.237 -0.158 0.174 -0.330
***
 0.028
***
 0.037 -0.088 
 0.320 0.100 0.102 0.121 0.009 0.050 0.051 
SLOPE    -0.643
**
 -0.269
**
 0.223 -0.421
***
 0.035 -0.032 -0.127 
 0.268 0.124 0.163 0.161 0.029 0.067 0.073 
Size 0.771 0.057 0.160
**
 0.055 0.112
***
 -0.007 0.096
***
 
 0.625 0.071 0.067 0.063 0.002 0.030 0.030 
DA -0.022 -0.010
***
 -0.008 -0.013
***
 -0.010
***
 -0.012
***
 -0.004
***
 
 0.024 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
CR -0.935
**
 0.000 -0.154 -0.001 -0.060 0.000 -0.001 
 0.423 0.001 0.116 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.001 
CAPrev -0.628
**
 -0.016
***
 -0.015
**
 0.001 0.001 -0.012
***
 0.000 
 0.288 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 
ROA(0) -0.171 0.202
***
 0.035
**
 0.056
**
 0.020 0.060
***
 0.025
***
 
 0.142 0.040 0.017 0.023 0.013 0.022 0.009 
ROA(-1) 2.528
***
 -0.184
***
 -0.013 -0.021 -0.013 -0.010 -0.027
***
 
 0.387 0.051 0.016 0.029 0.013 0.025 0.009 
ROA(-2) -2.316
***
 0.043 -0.007 0.019 -0.020
**
 -0.058
***
 -0.009 
 0.528 0.033 0.021 0.018 0.008 0.021 0.006 
N 715 1,748 2,291 616 1,148 5,062 1,979 
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Table 8. Regression Results-Down grades 
This table reports the result of the probit regression. YD is a dummy variable where one represents a bond experiencing a 
downgrade and zero no change at the next re-rating event within one year after issue. MW, CB, OCfin, OCutl, FIN, 
UTL,YANKEE, PUT, SF, Convert, Private, List are dummy variables where one represents respectively a make whole, a claw 
back, an otherwise callable, an otherwise callable financial, an otherwise callable utility, a financial, an utility and a Yankee 
bond, a putable, a sinking fund, a convertible, a privately placed, an exchange listed bond otherwise zero. Moreover SL is the 
security level of the bond, MAT represents the maturity of a given bond, LEVEL is the one year Treasury yield, SLOPE is the 
slope of the Treasury yield curve and the Size, DA (debt to assets ratio), CR (current ratio), CAPrev (capital expenditures to 
revenue ratio) and ROA (return on assets in the issue year and one and two years prior) are variables that represent the 
characteristics of the issuing firm. The MW and CB coefficients represent the likelihood that the corresponding bond will 
upgrade relative to the base case of a domestic ordinary callable industrial bond. Standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity are reported below each coefficient. 
 AA A BBB BB B IG BIG 
Cons -16.844 -4.970
***
 -2.375
***
 -1.318 -1.171 -5.606
***
 -2.119
***
 
 27.106 0.968 0.710 0.983 0.788 0.733 0.544 
CB N/A N/A N/A -0.614
***
 0.354 N/A -0.324
***
 
 N/A N/A N/A 0.216 0.203 N/A 0.115 
MW       0.824 1.168
***
 -0.258 -0.704
***
 0.979
***
 0.569
***
 -0.233 
 0.551 0.164 0.340 0.222 0.281 0.107 0.135 
UTL      -0.106 0.018 -0.156 -0.357 -0.397 0.058 -0.397
***
 
 0.459 0.121 0.128 0.203 0.230 0.074 0.150 
OCutl -2.001
** 
1.091
**
 -0.341 -3.593
***
 N/A 0.315 -5.096
***
 
 0.926 0.483 0.508 0.725 N/A 0.283 0.789 
FIN      -0.225 -0.307 -0.842
***
 0.224 0.084 -0.327
***
 0.245 
 0.420 0.162 0.201 0.259 0.278 0.095 0.165 
OCfin -0.129 0.932
***
 1.091
**
 1.397
***
 -0.884 0.744
***
 1.038
***
 
 0.718 0.199 0.440 0.379 0.869 0.142 0.252 
YANKEE -0.324 0.087 -4.112
***
 0.234 0.157 0.007 -0.119 
 0.699 0.225 0.633 0.377 0.216 0.131 0.192 
Put 0.674 -0.036 -0.196 -0.860 0.164 0.002 -0.201 
 0.465 0.258 0.401 0.463 0.259 0.202 0.200 
SF -24.842 0.128 -2.969
***
 0.543 -3.653
***
 0.355 0.729
**
 
 29.415 0.329 0.439 0.516 1.209 0.378 0.367 
SL -0.415 0.188 0.421
***
 0.223
**
 0.047 0.248
***
 0.143
**
 
 0.480 0.121 0.155 0.106 0.094 0.091 0.066 
Convert 4.154
*** 
0.933
**
 1.122
***
 -0.366 0.789
***
 0.854
***
 -0.252 
 1.314 0.396 0.392 0.409 0.255 0.271 0.178 
Private N/A N/A -3.273
***
 N/A -3.310
**
 -3.488
***
 -4.797
***
 
 N/A N/A 0.463 N/A 1.358 0.172 0.750 
List 13.123 0.023 0.174 -0.198 -0.266
***
 0.209
***
 -0.229
***
 
 23.778 0.117 0.113 0.136 0.091 0.059 0.066 
MAT -0.003 -0.003 -0.008
***
 0.014
***
 -0.015
***
 -0.003 0.004 
 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.003 
LEVEL       0.680
***
 0.139
***
 -0.322
***
 -0.055 -0.068 0.040 -0.106
**
 
 0.166 0.044 0.058 0.084 0.069 0.029 0.045 
SLOPE    0.615
**
 0.170
***
 -0.599
***
 0.084 0.017 0.016 -0.005 
 0.252 0.061 0.090 0.125 0.101 0.040 0.065 
Size 0.178 0.039 -0.034 -0.053 0.000 0.120
***
 0.099
***
 
 0.134 0.035 0.044 0.061 0.041 0.022 0.028 
DA 0.001 0.018
***
 0.021
***
 0.009
**
 0.003 0.016
***
 0.003
***
 
 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 
CR -0.820
**
 0.003
***
 -0.384
***
 -0.018 -0.200
***
 0.000 -0.018 
 0.354 0.001 0.090 0.033 0.055 0.000 0.012 
CAPrev 0.008 -0.002
***
 0.005
***
 -0.002 -0.007
***
 -0.001 -0.003
***
 
 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
ROA(0) -0.105 -0.177
***
 -0.066
***
 -0.102
***
 -0.078
***
 -0.077
***
 -0.066
***
 
 0.066 0.029 0.021 0.020 0.012 0.013 0.008 
ROA(-1) 0.323
***
 0.064 0.024
**
 0.023 0.022
**
 0.039
***
 0.026
***
 
 0.104 0.041 0.012 0.026 0.011 0.011 0.009 
ROA(-2) -0.306
***
 0.071
**
 0.003 -0.020 0.009 0.035
***
 0.012
***
 
 0.108 0.031 0.017 0.016 0.005 0.011 0.005 
N 500 2101 2525 670 1219 5,458 2,071 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% level 
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Figure I:Offering year distribution by call provision type
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This graph reports the number of claw back, make whole and ordinary callable bonds by year of issue
Claw Back Make Whole Ordinary Callable
